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“We should see certain things yet, let us hope
and believe”: Technology, Sex, and Politics in
Mark Twain’s Connecticut Yankee
Bernard J. Dobski, Jr. and Benjamin A. Kleinerman

Abstract: Through his modern “Yankee,” Mark Twain reveals to his readers the
underlying desire to overcome the very material world he seems to want to
instantiate. Although the Yankee seems a modern man who simply wants to create
the conditions in Arthurian England by which his body will be most comfortable,
both his zeal for this project and the trajectory of his soul’s course during the book
betray an underlying hope to overcome his “mortal coil” through ﬁrst technological
and then political projects. In charting the impetus and evolution of the Yankee’s
psychology for us, Twain teaches us much about the nature of the “modern
project”—its underlying hopes and its potential for dangerous, even totalitarian,
excesses. As appealing as the starkly contrasting Arthurians might be, given this
insight, Twain does not ultimately endorse this position but shows that its explicit
claim does not ultimately satisfy our desire for noninstrumental goods.

At the highest level, literature promises to political scientists the same
thing for our understanding of politics as political philosophy. It promises
to reveal not just what people do politically, but why they do what they
do—the underlying motivations for their political opinions and their corresponding political actions. Although political science can, of course,
speculate about such motivations, literature promises to show us what
we might only really know through experience. Even political philosophy,
insofar as it does not use the literary form, can only tell us from the outside,
as it were, the underlying motivations for human behavior. So, for
instance, Eric Voegelin and Raymond Aron have both argued that the
massive violence of the twentieth century became possible in modernity
because, at the bottom of modern philosophy and its politics, is an inversion of the Christian impulse. Where the Christian impulse sought salvation in the next world, this new inverted impulse seeks its salvation
through this-worldly actualization—an achievement whose fundamental
goodness is of such importance as to permit any and all means. Killing
millions becomes acceptable if such deaths promise a this-worldly
utopia that delivers salvation. But, as powerful as such an explanation
might be of the motivations of modernity, we cannot know its truth
unless we see it from the inside—see the power of the desire for thisworldly salvation playing itself out in the soul of an eminently modern
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man such as the Connecticut Yankee, Hank Morgan.1 Twain’s novel reveals
much of the same underlying motivation for the modern project as Aron
and Voegelin document but does so in a manner such that his own
modern readers can, by viewing and experiencing the Yankee’s hopes,
also see them in themselves.2
Through an examination of the hopes that fuel the Yankee’s politics, we will
ﬁrst attempt to show the paradoxical character of the modern political project.
Twain’s presentation of the Yankee suggests that, although the modern project
seems to aim to achieve only earthly comforts that make us feel fully at home
in the world, its truer, although subconscious, aim is to overcome the very
comforts to which it seems so dedicated. In other words, Twain’s art reveals
that the modern effort to undermine religion and to reduce man’s horizon
to the achievement of mere material comforts in this world ultimately
stems from, but cannot satisfy, our desire to give to our bodies a truly permanent piece of, to use the Yankee’s word, “clothing.” That is, the Yankee’s interest in material comforts stems from a desire to ﬁnd a true permanence that
material comforts can actually never deliver. Although the Yankee might
ﬁnd tremendously comfortable clothes, even the most comfortable clothes

1

For a similar statement of the beneﬁts of studying literature for political scientists,
see Catherine Zuckert, “Why Political Scientists Want to Study Literature,” PS: Political
Science and Politics 28 (2):189 –90 (1995).
2
All references to A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court are from the Signet
Classic edition with an “Afterword” by Edmund Reiss, published by Harper & Row.
While Twain’s literary genius has long been a source of study, his contributions to contemporary political philosophy have too rarely been appreciated. The most prominent
exceptions to this are “‘And In Its Wake We Followed’: The Political Wisdom of Mark
Twain” by Catherine and Michael Zuckert, Interpretation (Summer 1972): 59–93;
a section entitled ‘Connecticut Yankee: The Problem of Commercial Progress’ (443–
50) in the chapter “Mark Twain on the American Character” by David Foster in
History of American Political Thought, ed. Bryan-Paul Frost and Jeffrey Sikkenga,
(New York: Rowman and Littleﬁeld Publishers, Inc, 2003); Paul Cantor’s “Yankee
Go Home: Twain’s Postcolonial Romance,” in Democracy’s Literature: Politics and
Fiction in America, ed. Patrick J. Deneen and Joseph Romance (New York: Rowman
and Littleﬁeld Publishers, Inc., 2005); and Wilson Carey McWilliams, “Poetry,
Politics, and the Comic Spirit.” PS: Political Science and Politics 28 (2): 197– 200
(1995). This paper differs from each of these studies by its particular focus on
Twain’s treatment of piety and the issue of divine right. Catherine and Michael
Zuckert’s early work proved especially fruitful. It provides a comprehensive treatment
of the novel as a whole and has thus served as inspiration for many—including us—
who treat Twain as a political philosopher. We contend, however, that their treatment
of religion and divine right tends to get submerged. Subsequently, they do not draw
out as clearly as we think they could the relationship between the Yankee’s political
character and the work’s intent as laid out in the preface. For a defense of reading
the novel as a work of political philosophy, see Deneen and Romance’s introduction
to Democracy’s Literature.
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cannot protect us from decay and death. So, the Yankee pursues his project to
transform the Arthurian world into something much more like the technological nineteenth century with a zeal that, Twain implies, arises from his
interest in overcoming the material world he aims to create. This underlying
hope explains the Yankee’s otherwise puzzling transformation over the course
of the novel, something most scholars have, heretofore, attributed to Twain’s
inconsistency.3 The hope to overcome his “mortal coil” explains his transformation from a seemingly purely materialistic man seeking to maximize
his bodily comfort, to his dedication to the national body with its promise
of everlasting protection through participation in its immortality, to his dedication to his family and its promise of immortality through the production of
a new body (his daughter, “Hello-Central”). At each stage, his subconscious
hopes shape the content of his politics, and ultimately not only permit but
encourage the violent holocaust with which the book concludes.
Appreciating the subconscious longings that shape the Yankee’s politics,
the reader might be tempted to conclude that Twain embraces the alternative
position sketched throughout the novel, the fervent Christianity of the
Arthurians. Although they do seem to possess what the Yankee does not, selfsufﬁciency and self-mastery, we argue that Twain does not simply embrace
them as an alternative. Their religion points beyond itself: it ultimately
cannot satisfy the very hopes that would have motivated the embrace of it.
Where the Yankee’s modern materialism focuses almost exclusively on the
body and attempts to ignore the soul, the religion of the Arthurians focuses
almost exclusively on the soul and attempts to ignore the body. In the ﬁrst
case, the needs of the ignored soul emerge in a radical politics that seeks permanence through a utopian transformation of the nation. In the second case,
the needs of the ignored body emerge in either cruel policies, such as prima
nocta, or in sexual politics, such as the destruction of the Arthurian world
by the affair of Lancelot and Guinevere. Theoretically, the Arthurians’ position also collapses as its trajectory leads to something either superhuman
or subhuman. The neediness of the human condition causes the Arthurians
to turn to a religion that sees the living world as a “vale of tears” and
seems to allow them to transcend all such needs. We suggest that, just as
the Yankee’s exclusive focus on the body fails to satisfy his soul, the
Arthurians’ exclusive focus on the soul also fails to satisfy the soul—insofar
as the ignored bodily urges, such as sex, express or indicate a deeper erotic
or soul-desire. As the Yankee’s own turn toward immortality offered by
having had a child indicates—even as it seems to be a “mere” bodily
need—the desire for sex stems from a deeper longing for bodily permanence.
Twain wants to show us ﬁnally the very real limits on the human condition

3

See, for example, Henry Nash Smith, Mark Twain’s Fable of Progress: Political and
Economic Ideas in “A Connecticut Yankee” (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University
Press, 1964).
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and the insufﬁciency of any attempt to overcome them. Twain leads his
readers to a sober awareness of these limits, an awareness in which we
focus closely on the character of the human condition that gives rise to our
very hopes to overcome it. In other words, we must learn to stop ignoring
or attempting to overcome the strange mix of mortal body and soul that we
are, and instead focus on, thus freeing ourselves from, the wide array of
hopes that our strange condition creates. To state it is as clearly as possible:
Twain does not endorse one kind of response to our bodily and spiritual
needs over and against any other. Rather he tries to show us the mistake in
thinking that we can fully escape or satisfy (and thus be done with) the
needs of our bodies and souls if we only ﬁnd the right technical or spiritual
approach to them. Because such needs constitute a permanent part of the
human condition, we must learn to live with them. By becoming aware of
the hopes to which our needs give rise, we discover those hidden springs
of political action that remain otherwise concealed. In doing so, we achieve
sober wisdom, characterized by both self-understanding and political
moderation.

The Preface: The Mocked-At Mocking Believers in Progress
and the Problem of Divine Right
Our approach to Connecticut Yankee diverges from most scholarly efforts of
the last century, which read the novel either as a satire of medieval chivalry
(and thus a shot across the bow of contemporary England)4 or as a revision
of American beliefs in the unqualiﬁed goodness of science and technological
progress.5 Because the novel offers clear support for both positions, proponents of each side are forced to resort to Twain’s external comments about
4

See Bernard De Voto’s Mark Twain’s America (Boston, 1932); John B. Hoben’s “Mark
Twain’s A Connecticut Yankee: A Genetic Study,” American Literature 18 (Nov. 1946):
197–218; Louis Budd’s Mark Twain, Social Philosopher (Bloomington, IN, 1962);
Howard Baetzhold’s “The Course of Composition of A Connecticut Yankee,” American
Literature 33, (Jan. 1961) and Mark Twain and John Bull (Bloomington, IN, 1970). For a
more moderate view of the Yankee’s criticism of England, see Everett Carter’s “The
Meaning of A Connecticut Yankee,” American Literature 50 (1978): 418–40. Cantor in
“Yankee Go Home” reads the work as a screed about British colonialism.
5
See Alan Guttman’s “Mark Twain’s Connecticut Yankee: Afﬁrmation of the
Vernacular Tradition?” New England Quarterly 33 (June 1960): 232–37; Henry Nash
Smith Mark Twain, the Development of a Writer (Cambridge, MA, 1962) and Mark
Twain’s Fable of Progress (New Brunswick, NJ, 1964); James M. Cox “A Connecticut
Yankee in King Arthur’s Court: The Machinery of Self-Preservation,” Yale Review
50 (1960): 89– 102; and Kenneth Lynn’s Mark Twain and Southwestern Humor (Boston,
1959). For a nonpolitical scientist who adopts a reading similar to ours, see Gladys
Bellamy’s Mark Twain as a Literary Artist (Norman, OK, University of Oklahoma
Press, 1950).
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the novel either to support their view or to explain away contrary evidence.
Twain’s external writing, however, offers no clear or consistent position on
the novel.6 For instance, many scholars who claim Twain intends a satire
and criticism of medieval England and its contemporary counterpart cite a
passage from Twain’s autobiography. There, Twain writes: “I think I was
purposing to contrast that English life, not just the English life of Arthur’s
day but the English life of the whole of the Middle Ages, with the life of
modern Christendom and modern civilization—to the advantage of the
latter, of course.” But, almost immediately after this passage, Twain discusses
the current King of Belgium: “It is curious that the most advanced and most
enlightened century of all the centuries the sun has looked upon should have
the ghastly distinction of having produced this moldy and piety-mouthing
hypocrite, this bloody monster whose mate is not ﬁndable in human history anywhere.”7 After Twain claims that he will, “of course,” show the superiority of
modern civilization to earlier ages, he introduces a modern tyrant worse than
any tyrant that might have been seen in those earlier ages. In doing so, he
introduces the possibility that such tyranny is a product of modern civilization itself, thus casting into doubt his earlier claim that it is clearly superior.
Such a passage indicates the problem of depending too much on Twain’s
external commentary given his own claim that he exposes “to the world
only my trimmed and perfumed and carefully barbered public opinions”
and conceals “carefully, cautiously, wisely my private ones.”8 Wilson Carey
McWilliams makes a similar point about Twain’s manner of writing: “Reading
Mark Twain is easy, as smooth as oil and just as slippery; deciphering Twain
6

On the problems with turning solely to Twain’s external comments, see
James D. Williams’s “Revision and Intention in Mark Twain’s Connecticut Yankee,”
American Literature 36 (1964– 1965): 288 –97. Those who read Connecticut Yankee
either in light of Twain’s reading habits at the time or his prevailing political opinions
or his ever-worsening economic circumstances (see most of the literature cited in footnotes 4 and 5), ﬁnd themselves in the difﬁcult position of arguing that Twain’s work
merely reﬂected his immediate surroundings (making him very much a prisoner to
his times) and that Twain is a satirist (making him very much not a prisoner to his
times). As for the impact of the Paige typesetter’s failure on the novel’s tone and
mood (with the huge ﬁnancial losses it inﬂicted for Twain), one should consider
that despite the apparent despair in technological progress with which the novel concludes, Twain himself continued to work doggedly on (and invest heavily in) the Paige
typesetter for ﬁve years after the novel was published. And while his economic situation
ﬂuctuated considerably over the rest of his life (bankrupt in 1894, dying a wealthy man
in 1910), Twain’s literary style remained largely unchanged. We are more persuaded
by the Zuckerts’s “In Its Wake” that the work’s internal evidence suggests a unity of
composition and intention that deﬁes reducing the novel to changes in personal political views, reading habits, or economic standing.
7
Mark Twain, The Autobiography of Mark Twain, ed. Charles Neider (New York, NY:
Harper, 1959), 271– 72 (emphasis added).
8
Quoted in Zuckert and Zuckert, “In Its Wake,” 77.
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is difﬁcult and calls for a special sort of cryptography.” His footnote then provides the textual evidence for this claim. Quoting Twain, McWilliams writes:
“The ‘listener must be alert’ he said in ‘How to Tell a Story’ because the teller
‘will divert attention’ from the point ‘by dropping it in a casual or indifferent
way.’ In any autobiographical writing, Twain said—and surely all writing is
at least somewhat autobiographical—it is necessary to ‘read between the
lines.’”9 Twain’s own understanding of his manner of writing indicates that
we should not take him simply at his word; to understand him properly, we
must devote considerable care and attention, avoiding being taken in by
surface appearances.
In fact, in the preface of the book, Twain introduces a public opinion: he is a
conﬁdent believer in progress who will contrast “the ungentle laws and
customs” of historical Arthurian England with the humane achievements of
nineteenth-century America. He appears so conﬁdent in historical progress
that “whatever one of these laws or customs was lacking in that remote
time, its place was competently ﬁlled by a worse one.” Twain proceeds,
however, from his apparent belief in progress to a strikingly unprogressive
deduction concerning the necessity that the divine right of kings exist—a
deduction whose proof or refutation Twain found so difﬁcult he could not
settle it in this book. Twain juxtaposes a belief in the progressive character
of history with the “unavoidable deduction” that only the deity could
“unerringly” select the person “of lofty character and extraordinary ability”
who is to be “the executive head of a nation.” But, if this deduction is as unavoidable and as unsusceptible of simple refutation as Twain claims, then his
apparent belief in historical progress becomes nonsensical. If there is a deity
who selects persons of lofty character and ability, why would there be historical progress? In Twain’s ﬁrst formulation, the crucial question to ask of any
given regime would be: where does it occur in history? In Twain’s second formulation, the crucial question would be: has the deity selected its ruler?
Stated in this manner, each formulation rules out the other. A belief in historical progress makes a belief in divine right impossible, and a belief in divine
right does the same to a belief in historical progress. While some scholars
have also noted the equivocation between Twain’s nineteenth-century
world and the world of the Arthurians, this analysis of the preface shows
that they are not simply equivocal but mutually exclusive.
Does Twain mean us to see him as simply ironic in his “deduction” of
divine right? Has the conﬁdent believer in progress created a grand joke for
his modern readers whose own belief in progress would cause them to
treat such “deductions” mockingly? This would be a perverse irony because
he does take up the question in earnest in a second book: Personal Recollections

9

Wilson Carey McWilliams, “Divine Right: Mark Twain’s Joan of Arc” (published in
The Review of Politics 69, no. 3 [2007]: 329– 52). We would like to thank Susan
McWilliams for digging through her ﬁles and providing us with a copy of this paper.
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of Joan of Arc.10 Instead, Twain’s deeper irony appears to be on his mocking
modern readers, who ﬁnd him joking as he takes divine right seriously. Twain
has implied that both the belief in divine right and the belief in progress
amount to mere beliefs: one can either believe that God has chosen the ruler
or believe that history inevitably progresses. The preface’s deeper joke is on
those whose mocking attitude toward the unquestioned belief in divine right
stems from their own unquestioned belief in progress. They think themselves
the paradigms of rationality whose progressive views allow them to mock
ancient superstitions such as divine right. This joke on his readers extends to
some of the scholars who have written about the book. About his surprising
sympathy throughout the book toward the Arthurian world-view, one scholar
writes: “He had not fully disengaged himself from conventional genteel
attitudes toward Arthurian romance.”11 It is precisely those who believe
sympathy toward the Arthurians “conventional” and the embrace of
nineteenth-century views “progressive” and “liberated” that Twain mocks.
The conventional theology of America claims liberation from convention,
even as this claimed liberation is the most conventional attitude one can
assume.
Following his “unavoidable deduction” that seems to prove the existence of
divine right, he tells us that he found his encounter with “the Pompadour, and
Lady Castlemaine, and some other executive heads of that kind,” “so difﬁcult
to work into the scheme, that it was judged better to take the other tack in this
book.” Precisely those readers who come to see that both the belief in progress
and the belief in divine right are mere beliefs may become attracted to the
coherence and even the freedom of the Arthurians. Through their genuine
devotion to Christianity, they believe that God would only select men of
lofty character and extraordinary ability to rule a Christian nation. In an

10

While Twain doesn’t mention this book by name in his preface, the novel about
this French saint is the next new book he published. Not only does this book
examine the divine right of a single king—that tack seemingly abandoned by Twain
in his preface—but its genre (historical romance) and its format (a journalistic
account by Joan’s oldest friend and constant companion) invite further comparisons
with the Yankee. On Joan of Arc as the Yankee’s “follow-up,” see also Zuckert and
Zuckert “In Its Wake.” We understand these novels to form two sides of the same literary coin: to explore the claim that there is such a thing as a divine right of kings, and
thus to explore the theological implications of what the afﬁrmation or rejection of such
a claim would mean. The Yankee addresses this question from the perspective of what
is practically possible, exploring the political limits to divine intervention in human
affairs. Joan of Arc, taking its cues from such limits, offers a more extensive spiritual
meditation on the nature of divinity. The connection between the two books and the
priority of the tack taken in the Yankee thus appears informed by the spirit of that
Burkean insight that nothing which is practically false can be theoretically true.
11
See Henry Nash Smith’s Mark Twain’s Fable of Progress: Political and Economic Ideas
in “A Connecticut Yankee” (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1964).
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unavoidable deduction, the deity would only select those kings capable of
helping human souls overcome their bodies through devotion to Christianity.
Where the Yankee will be constantly troubled by his body’s needs and
wants—his experience in a suit of armor is the stuff of high comedy—the
Arthurians seem genuinely free of those same bodily wants. If both positions
stem from belief, why not choose the position free of internal contradiction—
it is far more contradictory to have faith in rational progress than to have
faith in faith—and seemingly free of the persistent needs of our bodies?
One might suggest that it is showing this problem that is the main “tack” of
the book.
But these two “executive heads” pose a problem for this tack. They actually
were not kings at all but, instead, the extremely inﬂuential mistresses of
Charles II and Louis XV. Lady Castlemaine’s erotic spell over Charles II transformed him into a spineless lover, permitting her to scandalize the throne
with her jealousies, humiliate the king with her inﬁdelities, and discredit
him in the eyes of his subjects. The Marquise du Pompadour was Louis
XV’s mistress for only ﬁve years, but remained inﬂuential by becoming the
arbiter of the king’s sexual taste, pimping out young girls to satisfy his appetite for ﬂesh. Why do such mistresses raise questions about Twain’s deduction? Kings demonstrate their lofty character and their extraordinary ability
through their self-mastery. To us who want to master our bodies, but are
troubled by our struggles to do so, their mastery of their bodies seems to
testify to their divinity. Precisely as kings look like foolish and ﬂesh-hungry
lovers, they no longer demonstrate the same self-mastery. They no longer
seem divine because they no longer promise the soul’s complete control of
the body. Perhaps, then, we could only have truly divine kings if they were
no longer subject to the needs and desires that constitute our shared humanity, such as the “divine right of cats” proposed by the Yankee’s charge,
Clarence. But this invites the question: Would the ability of nonhuman cats
to resist their human urges invite our admiration and cause us to call them
divine?

The Yankee’s Belief in Technology
During Twain’s ﬁrst conversation with the Yankee in nineteenth-century
Warwick Castle, the Yankee tells him that he is a man “nearly barren of sentiment, I suppose—or poetry, in other words”; he is a man who knows how
to make things, “guns, revolvers, cannon, boilers, engines, all sorts of laborsaving machinery.” The Yankee presents himself as an eminently practical
man, capable of making anything anybody could want. In introducing him,
Twain artfully indicates both the Yankee’s self-understanding and his lack
of understanding of himself. The Yankee invents whatever “a body” might
want: his bodily concerns make him aim to save the body more labor
than is necessary. Yet, Twain’s presentation raises questions about this
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self-understanding. After all, how do guns, revolvers, and cannon (the ﬁrst
things listed by the Yankee) save the body labor? Instead, they are necessary
for the body only if, as the Yankee soon says, “a man that is full of ﬁght” exists
inside the body. Why would a man so concerned with saving bodies unnecessary
exertion be so obviously full of ﬁght that he claims it “goes without saying?”12 For
instance, his encounter with Hercules’ crowbar was clearly not good for his body:
it “made everything crack, and seemed to spring every joint in my skull and
made it overlap its neighbor.” While he understands himself as eminently practical and concerned with bodily goods, Twain’s presentation points to his impracticality in protecting his body and thus his lack of self-understanding. We might
conclude at this point that such practical men—including all those for whom the
Yankee is making guns, revolvers, and cannons—by paying so much attention to
what their body wants leave their soul angry and in search of a ﬁght. By artfully
questioning the Yankee’s self-understanding, Twain has caused his readers to
examine their own.
The Yankee’s interest in technology appears to arise from his interest in
bodily comfort. What he ﬁnds most lacking in Arthurian England are the
“little conveniences” “that make the real comfort of life” (44).13 Through
such comforts, the Yankee thinks a man can become comfortable in a world
where he is otherwise not—they “make life bearable.” To achieve such comforts, he must “invent, contrive, create, reorganize things; set brain and hand
to work, and keep them busy” (45). And, although the Yankee must take his
bearings from nature, to paraphrase Bacon, he seeks not to understand but to
conquer it.14 As McWilliams writes, as an exemplar of modernity, the Yankee
recognizes “no models or limits in nature.”15
For the Yankee, the technological conquest of nature seems to stem purely
from his bodily desire to be as comfortable as possible. In this desire to be
comfortable, the Yankee ignores what is good for his soul: he attempts only
to make his body as comfortable as possible. Even his discussion of religion
treats it as “clothing” that a man simply chooses depending on what is comfortable;16 he cannot conceive that religion might demand something of the
soul apart from or even in opposition to what is comfortable.
12
For a similar argument connecting the “full of ﬁght” passage to his practicality, see
David R. Sewell, “Hank Morgan and the Colonization of Utopia,” in Mark Twain:
A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Eric J. Sundquist (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice
Hall, 1994).
13
See Foster, “American Character,” 444.
14
For another modern political philosopher whose approach to the soul’s longings
the Yankee’s project echoes and mirrors, see Montesquieu’s De l’esprit des lois, 25.12
([1748] 1951). In Oevres completes, ed. Roger Caillois. 2 vols. (Paris: Librairie
Gaillamard).
15
See McWilliams, “Comic Spirit,” 198.
16
Twain suggests the Yankee’s lack of seriousness about traditional religion by
having him use a clothing metaphor to describe conventional religious belief.
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That he remains “full of ﬁght” indicates that the concerns of his soul do not
simply recede with his singular focus on the body. Instead, below his level of
consciousness, the soul’s longings still lead him to fail to be as “comfortseeking” as he thinks himself. Even his very obsession with bodily goods
stems from something more than what the body wants; instead, it is his
soul that fuels the singular concern for the body or the soul itself that fuels
the forgetfulness of the soul. Somehow, technological goods that protect the
body promise ultimately to protect the soul by giving it sufﬁcient “clothing”
that it can overcome its susceptibility to nature, to the evils that otherwise
afﬂict the body.
Although the world of comfort provides sufﬁcient distraction for the body
that life can become “bearable,” it fails completely when contrasted with the
Arthurians. Though seemingly far more susceptible to nature because of their
complete lack of conveniences, nearly all of them are peaceful and content.
The Yankee encounters ﬁrst a young girl walking “indolently along, with a
mind at rest, its peace reﬂected in her innocent face” (17). They experience
contentment the Yankee never knew even in the modern world of conveniences—content men are not typically “full of ﬁght.” For him, unlike the
Arthurians, “it is strange how little a while at a time a person can be contented” (76). Through the Yankee, Twain shows us that, in its attempt to
make man’s body completely at home in nature by making man master of
nature, technological progress actually leaves us that much more susceptible
to nature. As such, our souls become that much more agitated and unsettled;
we seek technology to overcome the evils we experience, and technology
leads us to experience these evils that much more. To achieve for our souls
freedom and rest from the vagaries of nature, we become so singularly
focused on bodily comforts that we instead become the restless slaves of
the very nature we intended to master.
As we will see, below his level of consciousness, the Yankee’s hopes for
freedom migrate from the technological toward something more political.17
That being said, his attachment to technology does not simply disappear.
He continues his project to “civilize” Arthurian England through industrialization and commercialization. The extent to which this truly improves their
situation can be measured by the fact that the ﬁrst tangible result is an

“Spiritual wants and instincts are as various in the human family as are physical appetites, complexions, and features, and a man is only at his best, morally, when he is
equipped with the religious garment whose color and shape and size most nicely
accommodate themselves to the spiritual complexion, angularities, and statue of the
individual who wears it” (62). Such garments might appear nice on a man when he
is healthy, but they do not protect from winter, disease, and death.
17
That the Yankee’s psychology could transform without his own awareness is
suggested when he says at one point, “I had undergone a considerable change
without noticing it” (162).
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“atmospheric result . . . so pronounced that the king went sort of fainting and
gasping around, and Sir Lancelot got so that he did hardly anything but walk
up and down the roof and swear” (97). And it is technology that makes possible the horriﬁc mass-murder with which the book ends.

The Yankee’s Politicization
Over the course of the novel, the relation between the Yankee’s belief in technology and his politics shift. Whereas he ﬁrst sees politics merely as the
vehicle through which he can achieve his technological progress, he later
claims: “[M]y kind of loyalty was loyalty to one’s country.” He continues:
“The country is the real thing, the substantial thing, the eternal thing; it is
the thing to watch over, and care for, and be loyal to” (81 – 82). His attitude
toward the political nation has transformed from that which he must use to
achieve his progress and his ambition to something independently worthy
of respect. Below his own level of consciousness, he thinks this devotion to
country, over and above all else, will provide him the permanent protection
he wants.18 He calls his country “eternal,” that is, immortal or free from the
bounds of natural death, then claims the country, rather than institutions,
demands such devotion because “institutions are extraneous, they are its
mere clothing, and clothing can wear out, become ragged, cease to be comfortable, cease to protect the body, from winter, disease, and death” (82; italics ours).
That the Yankee’s soul has migrated toward a new form of hope and away
from technology is suggested by the very metaphor he uses in describing
his new love of country. Even with all our technological progress, clothing,
a human invention, still wears out and fails us: mere clothing cannot
give us the lasting protection from nature’s evils for which our souls long.19
So, the Yankee has “moved his stock” to politics and service to the country.
Through virtuous devotion to something as eternal as country, the Yankee
subconsciously hopes he can earn himself protection from the evils of the
natural world. While technology merely promises that he will forget his susceptibility to such natural evils, devotion to country offers him the hope that
he can overcome them.
Twain reveals that the Yankee in his depths is troubled not just by his mortality but by the constant struggle and defeat that life inevitably involves.
Despite his apparent energetic embrace of technology and his concomitant
“can-do” attitude, the Yankee seems to have an existentialist core, revealed
by Twain most when the Yankee confronts serious religiosity. So, in the
midst of a group of religious pilgrims, he “excused [him]self and dropped
to the rear of the procession, sad at heart, willing to go hence from this
18

It is surely part of Twain’s irony that the Yankee’s burgeoning nationalism directs
itself toward the salvation of England.
19
See footnote 13 above.
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troubled life, this vale of tears, this brief day of broken rest, of cloud, and
storm, of weary struggle and monotonous defeat” (135). Precisely because
of his lack of belief in the real possibility of a Christian afterlife, the struggle
and defeat he ﬁnds in this world are that much more troubling: “shrinking
from the change, as remembering how long eternity is” (135). Again,
McWilliams captures this aspect of the Yankee’s character well: “Modernity
is attracted to the romantic rebel who, sensing the failure of the modern
project, but fearing the prosaic and comic aspect of human life, asserts a despairing mastery through self-destruction.”20 One might go further and
suggest that the Yankee’s existential despair and his technological belief are
intrinsically connected; the Yankee creates to avoid thinking about his underlying despair, and his constant creating only makes his despair that much
deeper. Needless to say, such a dynamic needs something more than technology. And, because the Yankee’s technological viewpoint does not allow him to
believe in the afterlife that gives clear comfort to the Arthurians, he turns to a
search for comfort in this world by participating in the eternal through the
political transformation of an immortal nation. He hopes for a manifestation
of this transformation in his own lifetime: “[W]e should see certain things yet,
let us hope and believe” (214). In the person of the Yankee, Twain has provided a compelling account of the appeal and the power of nationalism in
the modern world.

Arthurian Piety vs. the Yankee’s “Piety”
One scholar, T.J. Lustig, writes of the Yankee: “[His] problem is not that he
can’t feel poetry but that he doesn’t know that he can feel it.”21 The
Yankee’s soul-abstraction is such that even as his soul longs for something
more, this longing takes place almost entirely below his own level of consciousness. In having such existential longings surface in the presence of pilgrims, who live their entire lives in service to their souls and disregard almost
completely their bodies, Twain surely intends us to contrast these two types of
souls. Monks, an extreme example of the type indicated by the pilgrims,
“wore the same garment until it fell from their bodies through age and
decay” (133). Again, we have this metaphor of clothing and our relation to
it. The Yankee ﬁrst searches for the most comfortable clothes, protecting his
body through technological advance. Then he turns to the political nation,
realizing that mere clothing cannot protect us from “winter, disease, and
death.” Devoting himself to the eternality of the nation promises him precisely such protection. Though the monks wear clothing, they are indifferent
to it; their devotion to God makes them forget their very need for clothing.
20
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They protect themselves from evils like disease and death by apparently
ceasing to concern themselves with them.
Clearly, literature can reveal the hidden springs within the human soul
whose political manifestations have very real consequences. For the
Yankee, the combination of his technological outlook and his existential
core points to a radical embrace of political change so as to achieve the protection that technology on its own fails to provide. Unlike the monks
whose extraworldly devotion seems to provide them the protection in this
world they desire, the Yankee cannot simply participate in the nation and
feel gratiﬁed by the thought of eternal rewards for such participation. The
Yankee’s technological viewpoint demands a material manifestation of his
devotion through concrete political change in his own lifetime.
Thus, the book’s ending is not simply precipitated by the clash of time
periods, as Foster maintains.22 It follows naturally from the combination
of the Yankee’s political hopes and his technological outlook. The Yankee’s
this-worldly hopes permit, or more precisely encourage, an astonishing
moral callousness. Precisely because he thinks his cause so intrinsically
noble and worthy of devotion, he sees no limits upon those activities he
ﬁnds necessary for the achievement of his “project” of revolutionizing
Arthurian England. Moreover, because the Yankee’s politics still remain
eminently technological insofar as he aims only at the end of a republican
England without regard to the means by which he achieves this end, there
are no internal limits upon what he will do to achieve his political goals.
In the same way that we moderns will do almost anything we think necessary
for the scientiﬁc conquest of nature because the goodness of the relief of man’s
estate justiﬁes the means by which we achieve it, our politics, as represented
by the Yankee, potentially exhibits this same utilitarian calculus.
Of course, all of this violence motivated by “good intentions” might be said
to be an inverted form of the same kind of pious cruelty Machiavelli blamed
Christianity itself for having created. Of this argument, Leo Strauss writes:
“From Machiavelli’s point of view, the Biblical teaching regarding man’s
destiny appeared to lead to a more than Manlian severity, to pious cruelty,
as a duty.”23 Such pious cruelty of the Christian variety is demonstrated in
the book by Queen Morgan Le Fay who justiﬁes the extreme torture of a suspected criminal by claiming “it were peril to my own soul to let him die
unconfessed and unabsolved.” It is her piety that demands the criminal’s
torture: “I were a fool to ﬂing me into hell for his accommodation” (106).
Yet Twain juxtaposes Le Fay’s Christian cruelty with other examples that
lead us to evaluate the consequence of Christian piety in a much better
light than the consequences of the Yankee’s this-worldly piety. In fact, a
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comparison of Le Fay’s actions with the rest of the Arthurians’ leads to the
conclusion that her actions have more in common with the man whose
name she shares, Hank Morgan, than those with whom she shares a time
period.24
Such is the case. Twain demonstrates that both the Arthurians’ trust in the
providence of God and the standards of piety and nobility demanded by their
profound religiosity tend to moderate their behavior within this world. As the
Yankee says: “More than once, I had seen a noble, after ambushing and dispatching his enemy, retire to the nearest wayside shrine and humbly give
thanks, without even waiting to rob the enemy” (101). The Arthurians most
often speak of God’s will as “unknowable” and hold themselves only to a
standard of nobility with which they hope God will be pleased.25 As such,
the Arthurians’ beliefs about nobility and piety, rather than inviting limitlessness, mark a limit on their actions. If we cannot know the will of God, then we
must hold ourselves to some morally appropriate standards of which we
think and hope God will approve. This is not to say that the Arthurians’ aristocratic morality is not without its serious moral limitations, but, with the
exception of Le Fay, Twain never shows them engaged in truly unrestrained,
despicable behavior for the sake of piety.
By contrast, the Yankee’s this-worldly hopes encourage—from the springs
of his understanding of morality itself—what looks to be morally rotten behavior. For instance, in the meeting with Morgan Le Fay, even though he knows
he has the power to save the composer whom the queen wishes to hang for a
substandard performance, the Yankee “saw that she was right” and even gave
“her permission to hang the whole band” (104). In one of Twain’s most
wicked ironies, the Yankee justiﬁes and even celebrates his action by claiming
that “a statesman gains little by the arbitrary exercise of iron-clad authority
upon all occasions that offer . . . a little concession, now and then, where it
can do no harm, is the wiser policy” (104; italics ours). In hanging the whole
band, the Yankee is acting not immorally but as an admirable “statesman.”
His “pious” hopes for earthly political change have encouraged shockingly
unlimited means for its achievement. Morgan Le Fay must believe that she
knows the mind of God—why else would she think that torturing a criminal
24
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to elicit a confession important? Her belief invites similarly unlimited actions.
Ultimately, it reveals more about the moral callousness invited by the presumption that we can control God’s will, in this life or the next, than it does
about the problems with the Christian God, especially insofar as the
Christian God is considered unknowable.
As Tocqueville writes of democratic man in general, the Yankee is concerned for the common man in the abstract but not for any particular
human being. So, when he sees real examples of Christian priests treating
the common people quite humanely, he calls these instances “something of
this disagreeable sort,” characterizing them as “episodes that showed that . . .
the great majority [of these priests] . . . were sincere and right-headed, and
devoted to the alleviation of human troubles and suffering” (109– 10; italics
and brackets ours). In the Yankee’s bizarre moral world, he acts as a statesman
when he gives the order to hang the whole band, but the priests are “disagreeable” when they devote themselves to the alleviation of human troubles and
sufferings. The Yankee’s concern for human suffering is abstract and ultimately, Twain suggests, connected not to his real concern for these common
people. Rather they are connected to his hopes that his apparent concern
for them through revolutionary political change will earn him the protection
from natural evils for which he so desperately longs.
Twain’s depiction of the Yankee anticipates and cautions against the
twentieth-century experience of “moral” totalitarianism. That is, Twain cautions against the experience of vast tyrannies predicated not on the oppression of the people but, instead, on a supposed utopian future the tyrant
promises—tyrannies that will, as the Yankee does, mouth the words of republics even as they create technological totalitarianism. Such tyrannies will use
technology, both its methods and its new antireligious worldview, to create
vast killing machines that can remain wholly blind to their moral evils precisely because they promise such tremendous moral goods. Through seeing
such evil in the Yankee’s psychology, we can also see for ourselves the truly
frightening forms that our pious impiety can take. If history promises a
future utopia, however it is deﬁned, then any and all actions that move us
toward such a utopia is justiﬁed. The piety of the true believer, who thinks
the future “unknowable” except to God, looks much more attractive
because it is far more likely to view actions in light of their immediate
moral consequences rather than their future moral beneﬁts.

Arthurian Alternatives
Twain’s novel, however, shows that even the piety of the true believer, as
attractive an alternative as it may appear, falls short. And it does so
because it fails to satisfy the hopes that originally invite one to embrace it.
Twain’s treatment of this pious alternative is best prepared by reﬂecting
ﬁrst on the work’s presentation of the romantic chivalry of Arthur and his
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knights. As Twain shows, the Arthurians’ denial of bodily needs in the effort
to perfect their souls is misguided precisely because it ignores the extent to
which their spiritual longings are rooted in their own bodily desires. To
ignore the body on behalf of the soul is also to ignore a crucial aspect or
dimension of the soul’s most deeply felt needs, an aspect or dimension that
Twain’s novel tries to address in part simply by bringing it to our attention.
As we will see, this need is for something more than mere “clothing.”
Across almost every page of his work, Twain splashes evidence of the
Arthurians’ mastery of those bodily desires that constantly nag the Yankee.
Whether it is “Sandy’s” ability to withstand hunger, heat, and cold; the
knights’ reckless pursuit of gory escapades; Lancelot’s chivalry; or Arthur
risking his own life to comfort one of his subjects, the members of the aristocracy consistently show themselves masters of their bodily passions. But reﬂection compels one to wonder if the Arthurians’ moral virtue is rooted in a
profound way in their bodily desires, and ultimately in the hope for bodily
permanence. In other words, whereas the Yankee concerns himself with his
body ultimately to achieve his soul’s desire for bodily permanence, the
Arthurians are recklessly indifferent to their bodies in order to achieve precisely that same permanence. The virtuous mastery of bodily desires, at its
deepest level, results not from the soul’s desire to transcend the body completely, as appears to be the case, but to give the body the same sort of permanent
“clothing” for which the Yankee also longs.
The Yankee’s ﬁrst genuine encounter with the valor and chivalry of the
Arthurians proves telling in this respect as it offers the ﬁrst indication of a
paradox at the heart of both their virtue and, ultimately, their piety. In his
ﬁrst foray into Arthurian “politics,” the Yankee decides to observe their
weekly jousting tournaments in the hope of “improving” them. The excerpt
of this account focuses on the heroic exploits of Sir Gareth who risked life
and limb in taking on and defeating thirteen knights. As evidenced by the
report, Sir Gareth possessed a daring that required him to master his fear
of grave bodily harm. But the excerpt also reveals to us (though not the
Yankee who misses this point completely)26 that Gareth did not do so
simply to win glory for his martial valor. Rather, he sought to win the
affections, and thus the romantic charms, of his beloved. His apparent disregard for bodily harm and even death—the precondition of his martial
virtue—serves another desire rooted in the body he appears to disregard so
bravely.
Of course, the careful reader, following Twain’s own artistry here, will be
tempted to contrast the example of Sir Gareth with that of Lancelot, the representative of Arthurian chivalry. Lancelot refused to give battle to his fellow
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knight on the grounds that his certain victory would deprive Gareth of his
beloved’s attentions. That he makes his noble refusal in private, away from
the approving eyes of his peers, suggests he does not seek the approbation
of others for his self-restraint. The true models of Camelot appear to master
their self-interests out of a love of virtue for its own sake, independent of
any external goods they might win or bodily desires they might gratify. But
Lancelot is also Queen Guinevere’s lover. By informing us of his adultery,
Twain darkens the picture of a purely virtuous Lancelot. He invites us to
revisit the possibility that Lancelot’s virtue derives from both his desire for
the Queen’s physical charms and from his own sense of what it would
mean for him to be publicly “exposed” as much as from his attachment to
virtue.
Despite the fact that, or precisely because, the examples of Gareth and
Lancelot introduce us to Arthurian chivalry, they suggest that the selfcontrol and virtue of the knights are predicated on an uneasy relation
between the demands of the body and the demands of the soul. Focusing
on the state of their souls, they appear indifferent and courageous in the
face of bodily harm; but this very courage appears ultimately linked to
the achievement of sexual, and thus bodily, goods. Insofar as the Arthurians
are forced to choose the demands of virtue over the goods of this world, the
novel suggests that the body, forced by moral virtue to oppose itself to the
soul, seeks ways to satisfy its long-ignored desires. Thus, concessions to
certain bodily desires account for both the pious cruelties supporting
Arthur’s rule, that is, prima nocta, and the war that brought that rule to its
end, the adulterous affair between Lancelot and Guinevere.
Of course, the truest model of Arthurdom is not Lancelot, but King Arthur
himself. And Arthur appears in no way torn between the demands of the
body and the demands of the soul; he places the interests of the soul ﬁrmly
above the concerns and needs of the body. In what is perhaps the greatest
act of selﬂessness in the work, Arthur and the Yankee, disguised as peasants,
enter a peasant’s hut ravaged by small-pox. There the King comforts a dying
mother by affording her one last look at the body of her dead daughter. The
Yankee begs the King to ﬂee the home. Arthur rebukes him: “[I]t were shame
that a king should know fear, and shame that belted knight should withhold
his hand where be such as need succor” (200). Awe-struck by such selfmastery, the Yankee admiringly notes:
Here was heroism at its last and loftiest possibility, its utmost summit; this
was challenging death in the open ﬁeld unarmed, with all the odds against
the challenger, no reward set upon the contest, and no admiring world in
silks and cloth of gold to gaze and applaud . . . He was great now; sublimely great. (202)

Arthur’s heroism suggests that he has, in fact, overcome, in favor of the soul,
the competing demands of body and soul that plague the Yankee and the
knights. If he has actually reconciled such demands, then Arthur appears
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the work’s real hero and the true alternative to the Yankee’s technological
excesses and political materialism. But Twain does not present this argument
about the Arthurians’ virtue and piety solely through the King and his
knights. As both the fabric27 and substance of the Yankee’s manuscript tell
us, the real power in Britain is not Arthur but the Church. The truth about
the power behind Arthur’s throne should, therefore, reﬂect the truth about
the Arthurians themselves.

The Clergy, the Family, and the Hermetic Ideal
Taken to its logical extreme, the virtue of the Arthurian nobility seems to point
to the complete mastery, and thereby total elimination, of one’s bodily needs
and desires. The clergy, through piety, lives dedicated to prayer and the alleviation of human suffering, and vows of poverty and chastity, seem to
approach the “complete mastery” of bodily desires intimated in the Arthurians’
chivalry. Just like the knights, however, a question remains as to the source of
their dedication and attachment to others. Such a question is introduced most
clearly by the revelation that there is an orphanage, overcrowded no less,
located between the monastery and the convent in the Valley of Holiness. The
apparent asceticism—the complete bodily mastery of the monks and nuns—is
called into question by the presence in their midst of many children “without
parents.”
Such questions, however, force us to rethink once again not only the contradiction revealed by the presence of such children but the nature of the religious vocation itself. Although Twain’s presentation does certainly invite us
to wonder about the actual “bodily mastery” of the monks and nuns, at a
deeper level it also asks us to reconsider the nature of their very piety.
Were it not for the erotic impulse revealed by their sexual congress with
each other, would their devout piety be possible? After all, as is ﬁnally
revealed by the presence of these children—children who are never mentioned in the context of the knights’ romantic transports—sex is never
simply sex. However mysterious it might be, the bodily desire to
“commune” with another human being promises much more than mere
bodily satisfaction. Although not reducible in its promise to the children
that may be produced, the production of such children—who live long
after those who have created them—is certainly a sign of the bodily permanence promised by sex. The nuns’ and priests’ devotion to both God and to
the suffering of other human beings stems from the same essential desire
and expectation of the soul to transcend this “mortal coil” as transports the
27
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soul, in contradistinction to the body, in sex. Although distinguishable from
the body, however, in both cases the soul’s transport is impossible without it.
This essential link between the divine, on one hand, and sex (in its most
developed form, romantic love), on the other, is suggested by the effusive outburst of the Yankee about his newfound love for his wife, Sandy:
People talk about beautiful friendships between two persons of the same
sex. What is the best of that sort, as compared with the friendship of man
and wife, where the best impulses and highest ideals of both are the same?
There is no place for comparison between the two friendship; the one is
earthly, the other divine. (284–85; italics ours)

The narrative suggests that the Yankee has almost nothing in common with
Sandy although he does have a fondness for her.28 Furthermore, as we
will soon see, he married her only because he thought their relationship
inappropriate without marriage. Such “divinity” must have existed not so
much in their friendship as in their bodily communion with one another,
which resulted, on one occasion, in their daughter, “Hello-Central.” For the
Yankee, whose soul is especially stuck in the earth though it longs for
more, such communions must have felt divine because they seemed to take
him, if only temporarily, beyond his bodily concerns.
The clergy’s communions with God have a similar effect on their bodies. We
can recognize the happiness between man and wife as “divine” because we
have similar hopes from what we actually recognize as divine. What
we recognize as divine seems not to be some ethereally spiritual abstraction
from the body, but the perfect union of the good of both body and soul.
Thus, contrary to what we might have hoped for given the problems besetting
the Yankee’s singular focus on the body, the clergy have not truly transcended
their bodies in their communion with God. Instead, insofar as the very feeling
of transcendence remains intimately connected to their soul’s existence within
a body, their bodies remain the precondition for their devotion. So far from
contradicting it, the clergy’s active sex lives make possible their active lives
of devotion to God and his work.
Twain’s novel offers two alternatives to this dynamic: embrace fully those
physical longings for some kind of permanence or practice asceticism more
consistently than the clergy—either the Yankee’s ﬁnal embrace of family life
or the hermits who dot the English countryside. In other words, if the question is between the embrace of the body’s urges and the full and complete
embrace of the soul, then the Yankee’s family life and the presence of the
hermits represent the two possibilities.
Our prior treatment of the Yankee’s psychology neglected the last aspect of
his transformation: his Rousseauian turn to the life of the nuclear family at the
28
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conclusion of the novel.29 Seemingly, the Yankee’s exclusive focus on the body
has ﬁnally found its fullest and healthiest manifestation in his love of both
“the perfectest form of friendship” with his wife Sandy and his love of “the
center of the universe” (285), his daughter “Hello-Central.” His daughter’s
smile could “sweep night out of the world” and, when she falls ill, he
claims his continued existence in “this world” hangs on her fate alone
(286). The once selﬁsh Yankee now selﬂessly dedicates himself to the
welfare of the body he created; indeed, the action of the novel suggests that
he does so at expense of the men he hoped to manufacture for his new politics.
In fact, the Yankee’s transformation into a family man seems so dramatic that,
on his deathbed, the Yankee calls out to Sandy to dispel the awful remnants
of his “modern nightmare”—Merlin had condemned him to return to the
nineteenth century after the dramatic battle that ends his narrative in the
sixth century.
Through his dedication to his family, the Yankee appears to achieve what
neither the clergy nor the knights could: the consummation and completion
of the soul’s desire for bodily permanence intimated and promised by the
soul’s transport involved in sex. That is, by doing more than simply creating
a body and then ignoring its care, as the clergy does, or participating in
romance and then ignoring its consequences, as the knights seem to do, the
Yankee, contrary to what had been his failure to attend properly to his soul
in his technological and political hopes, seems to have achieved, in this
brief moment of complete and selﬂess devotion to other bodies, the true
desires of the soul. Does Twain, then, endorse ﬁnally the Yankee’s brief, but
seemingly profound, Rousseauian transformation into a man who has
found his completion in the family?
Both the timing and the character of the Yankee’s transformation belie this
conclusion. It is only when it is clear that the Yankee’s project has ﬁnally
failed, though he will still make his last stand in the cave, that the Yankee realizes the extent of his attachment to the family. If his familial attachment
follows subconsciously from his failure to realize the political transformation
that had previously promised his soul so much, then it appears more a new
strategy for fulﬁllment than fulﬁllment itself. If the appeal of the family is the
fullness and self-sufﬁciency promised by a complete immersion in the bodily
fulﬁllment promised by the sex that precedes it, then it cannot be a strategy
concocted by the soul out of hope. Instead, it must simply be an actual selfsufﬁciency that the soul might simply observe has occurred. Moreover, the
character of the Yankee’s domestic bliss seems a little less blissful when we
note what the Yankee says almost immediately before his effusive comments
about the divinity of his and Sandy’s love. He tells us that he originally
married Sandy “for no particular reason” except out of custom. He was a
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“New Englander, and in my opinion this sort of partnership would compromise her sooner or later” (284). And in the earlier part of the marriage, when
domestic bliss is usually at its peak, the Yankee notes that “[i]n my dreams . . .
I still wandered thirteen centuries away, and my unsatisﬁed spirit went calling
and harking all up and down” (284; italics ours) for his ﬁfteen year-old sweetheart, a telephone operator who, it seems, said little more than “hello” to the
Yankee.30 Again, given his real feelings for Sandy, the Yankee’s transformation
suggests not so much the completeness and self-sufﬁciency of the family
experience as the incompleteness and inadequacy of his soul, searching
now for a new solution to its dissatisfaction.
If the Yankee’s soul remains dissatisﬁed even as it throws itself into the
family, perhaps Twain endorses instead the solution offered by the religious
hermits. In contrast to the clergy, whose continuing attachment to bodily
goods is represented not only by their sexual activity but also by their continued service to the concerns of humanity at large—after all, what is such service
but attention to the bodies that exist only in this “vale of tears”—the hermits
seem to achieve a true freedom from all concerns of the body. The hermits
leave behind entirely all attachment to humanity. They achieve a form of
piety and self-mastery purer than the monks and nuns by completely degrading their bodies. Furthermore, unlike the clergy, the hermits actually perform
miracles (57, 85, and 97). As such, their asceticism not only reveals an overcoming of their bodies, it also indicates a parallel movement toward greater holiness and divinity. Their devotion to God seems so complete that they are
freed from any and all bodily concerns, becoming thus capable of bodily
deeds of which everyone else can only stand in awe. But, even as we stand
in awe of these hermits, we wonder if their holiness and divinity have not culminated in something that wholly abstracts from our humanity. In other
words, though they seem to have perfected the Arthurian virtue of selfmastery insofar as one can no longer trace in them a remaining attachment
to bodily goods, their very mastery strikes us as inhuman. Thus, although
the Arthurians ﬁnd them curious but impressive, few are inspired to their
worship or utter devotion especially as compared to the worship and utter
devotion that King Arthur inspires. The insufﬁciency of the hermits as
ideals, insofar as they simply transcend rather than perfect our humanity,
will only become clear once we return to a consideration of King Arthur.

The Divine Right of Kings and Cats
It would not be implausible to conclude that the true hero of the novel is King
Arthur. After all, his heroism in the peasant’s hut is without comparison in its
30
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obvious freedom from any conception of bodily reward of any sort. Later,
appearing as a slave and without any clothes, Arthur still regarded himself
a king. In other words, his greatness appears to have been more than
merely conventional; it seemed to radiate from the inside, from his soul.
It is precisely such greatness that inspired the devotion of Arthur’s subjects.
Moreover, in his “laying-of-hands,” related to us by the Yankee, Arthur, like
the hermits, appears truly capable of miracles. When pilgrims occasionally
seek out the hermits, they do so to revere, to pray, and to receive or, most
likely, to witness the occasional miracle. Arthur’s subjects constantly seek
him out to obey, worship, and be healed by him. The hermit’s miracles are
sources of wonder; Arthur’s miracles are sources of salvation and hope.
Thus, as the Yankee presents it, the ritual and frequent “laying-of-hands”
by Arthur upon his sick subjects in order to cure them is essential to the
success of his rule. If the “laying-of-hands” is no longer successful, the
King’s rule will not last.
Given our prior claim that Twain, in his preface, actually intends us to take
divine right more seriously than his mocking “progressive” readers might
have, the novel’s account of Arthur and Arthur’s rule provides us with even
more grounds for this contention. For instance, insofar as the “laying-of-hands”
seems capable of actually curing the sick, the joke seems to be, not on the
Arthurians, but on the Yankee incapable of seeking such a cure for his ailing
daughter because of his belief that it is mere “mummery.” But, even as we are
meant to take these things seriously, Twain’s preface also cautions us against
it—those previously discussed mistresses prevent Twain, at least, from embracing divine right unconditionally. To see what we should take seriously and why
we should stop short of embracing it unconditionally, we must provide a fuller
account of what exactly Arthur’s subjects want from him. Twain leads us to such
reﬂection by providing us with a strange, but telling, alternative proposal: the
divine right of cats.
In Twain’s presentation, Arthur’s rule appears more attractive than the
Yankee’s republicanism because it seems capable of providing the people
with divine intervention in their affairs—an intervention that would be
impossible in the eminently earthly technological republic envisioned by the
Yankee. The “laying-of-hands” is but one example of this intervention. At
another point in the novel, the Yankee tells the wife of one of Morgan Le
Fay’s prisoners that her husband will be freed from the rack and spared the
gallows. Hearing this news, she declares: “He is saved—for it is the King’s
word by the mouth of the king’s servant—Arthur, the king whose word is
gold!” (108). For this woman, Arthur’s word can be trusted because he
speaks for more than himself: he speaks for God. The rule of a prudent and
caring king who represents God appears capable of righting earthly wrongs
and liberating the people from a world beset with evils. A republic might
give them self-governance, but it cannot give them the same grounds for hope.
It is precisely the attractiveness of Arthur’s rule vis-à-vis republics that
causes Clarence to propose his “divine right of cats.” Cats would provide
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the same beneﬁts without the accompanying drawbacks: the susceptibility of
kings to human excesses and emotions that make them the prey of mistresses
or the instruments of torment used against the people. Thus Clarence says:
The character of these cats would be considerably above the average king,
and this would be an immense moral advantage to the nation, for the
reason that a nation always models its morals after its monarch’s. The
worship of royalty being founded in unreason, these graceful and harmless cats would easily become as sacred as any other royalties, and
indeed more so, because it would be presently noticed that they hanged
nobody, beheaded nobody, imprisoned nobody, inﬂicted no cruelties or
injustices of any sort, and so must be worthy of a deeper love and reverence than the customary human king, and would certainly get it. (280)

While obviously irreverent and even absurd31—Clarence concludes his
remarks by meowing like a cat!—this is also the lengthiest and most explicit treatment of divine right in a novel whose stated purpose is to explore that very
theme. Cats can succeed where human beings fail because they eliminate the
passionate attachment to other human beings that proves problematic for the
novel’s royalty, like Charles II and Louis XV of the preface, or even King
Arthur.32 That is, because they truly are free of the bodily concerns that
plague human beings, cats can fulﬁll what human beings want from their
kings without falling prey to what human beings do not want from their kings.
Such a conclusion, however, fails to take into account the true grounds
upon which Twain rejects divine right. As advanced here, the suggestion
about cats offered by Clarence—the most enthusiastic supporter of the
Yankee’s reforms and perhaps the most consistently impious character in
the novel—embodies not Twain’s reasoning but the reasoning of the
modern mockers Twain has already implicitly mocked in his preface. To
them and to Clarence, all beliefs about kings and gods are utterly irrational,
“founded in unreason,” and point as much to cats running the government
as to men like Arthur. But Twain does not endorse this view. Instead, his presentation of Arthur indicates his impressiveness rather than his ridiculousness.
Therefore, besides its practical impossibility, why is it, in Twain’s presentation, that cats would not fulﬁll what we want from kings? In seeing this,
we will see that Twain rejects divine right not because of the persistent
problem of the king’s humanity but because it is, ultimately, an inadequate
response to our humanity.
Truly, the people worship Arthur and merely gaze at the hermits because
Arthur promises them salvation and redemption; the hermits merely deliver
spectacle. Arthur promises the people worldly deliverance—the righting of
31
It seems precisely the absurdity of this passage which justiﬁes its neglect to so
many scholars of Twain’s work.
32
Queen Guinevere’s affair with Lancelot not only made the King a cuckold, heaping
shame onto his throne, but it also deprived Arthur of a legitimate heir (178, 288).
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the wrongs and evils from which they suffer. One might think that if cats could
deliver such redemption, the people would accept it. As shown through the
hermits’ bodily mastery, is not the direction of Arthurian virtue beyond
humanity? This is Clarence’s conclusion; this is the conclusion, ultimately, of
the modern mocker. But such a conclusion remains inattentive to the true
grounds for the people’s obedience to Arthur, to any impressive king, and concomitantly, to the true grounds for the disappointment felt when kings behave
like Charles II or Louis XV. The people are so impressed with Arthur because he
remains human in that he remains an obvious mixture of soul and body, refusing to become either entirely one (the hermit) or entirely the other (the Yankee).
He is impressive because one feels he still has bodily urges, but he has mastered
them. The people worship him, in particular, because he promises them salvation for their souls and their bodies—the “laying of hands” promises bodily
cures. The people could not hope or expect cats, however mysterious, that
have not so mastered human urges to provide the same cures. The cure
could only be provided by a human king. The divinity of the king only inspires
the people to worship insofar as he remains human. For this reason, the people
and Twain are troubled by kings, like Charles and Louis, who appear
all-too-human.
Stated this way, the question now can become: How well does the
Arthurian “solution” reconcile with our deepest human needs? If the true
grounds of our belief in Arthur stem not from his divinity, as such, but
from his “divine” humanity, then one is led back to the human. To return
to the human, however, departs from the trajectory of Arthurian religiosity,
whose exclusive focus on the soul does not allow us to wrestle with or accommodate our all-too-human needs. The uncovering of the grounds upon which
the people respect and worship Arthur does not prove that the trajectory of
their religion provides these grounds. This means that we, or Twain, as the
observers of the novel, are left on our own to provide the account that none
of these solutions have provided. In fact, perhaps Twain includes himself precisely to provide another “solution” beyond those presented by the novel.33
But such talk of “solutions” obfuscates the essential insight that the contrast
between our reaction to the hermits and Arthur truly teaches us. In Twain’s
presentation, the Arthurians’ (and the reader’s) appreciation of Arthur is
not solely because of what he provides for us. We also appreciate Arthur
because his type of virtue is understandable to us. As such, it is not simply
a better or worse “solution” to the human problem and, for that matter,
neither is our appreciation of Twain. In seeking human goods, we do not
simply seek what will beneﬁt us; we also seek what we can understand.
This, perhaps more than any other reason, explains why neither we nor the
Arthurians could ever submit to the rule of cats, no matter how beneﬁcial

33

For another attempt to make sense of Twain’s place in the novel’s argument, see
Foster, “American Character,” 450. See also Zuckert and Zuckert, “In Its Wake,” 66.
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or free from injustice their governance might be.34 Our desire to ﬁnd a good
that we understand betrays a concomitant desire to have a good worthwhile
for its own sake, just as understanding seems worthwhile for its own sake.
Even as we seek virtue as a “solution” to the human problem, we are attracted
to it because it appears to be good for its own sake. If virtue is sought precisely
as an instrumental good, it no longer seems appealing. If Sir Gareth behaves
bravely only to win his love’s respect, he no longer seems deserving of the
very respect he seeks. Or, in his turn to the family, the Yankee can be successful in providing his soul with the satisfaction for which he longs only if he has
not sought such success, instead merely observing his new and profound satisfaction. Such insights reveal the extent to which every “solution” in Twain’s
book fails precisely because they are “solutions.” As such, they are merely an
instrumental good that cannot fulﬁll our soul’s deeper desire, however mysterious, for noninstrumental goods. The Yankee’s deepest appreciation and
reverence for Arthur stems from the noninstrumentality of his heroics in
the peasant’s hut—after all, if even the eminently instrumental Yankee most
appreciates Arthur at his noninstrumental ﬁnest, we learn that much more
about the character of all of our souls. As much as such reverence reveals
both the kind of virtue we most want and the requirement that such virtue
be understandable to us, we cannot then revere it for instrumental
reasons—such a position would be contradictory to our desire for a coherent
good. Given this additional requirement, it becomes impossible to continue to
view Arthur as worthy of obedience and constituting the novel’s true hero.
Thus Twain surfaces not so much as an alternative “solution” but as simply
an alternative life entirely. His literary interests and even his very interest in
the life of the Yankee seem to stem not from his desire for some superior solution but simply from his intellectual curiosity—a curiosity whose satisfaction is not instrumental to any more fundamental desire. The exploration of
the variety of human “solutions” in the novel thus points to the need for
us, if we truly want to achieve what our soul most wants, to think our way
through the very search for solutions, learning instead to rest satisﬁed with
the coherent and noninstrumental good that learning for its own sake can
provide. Of course, such learning does provide a solution but a solution
that does not rest on the same sorts of hopes on which all other solutions
rest. By promoting a noninstrumental good, Twain suggests a posture that
takes its point of departure from those limits to which we appear consigned,
starting with our mortality. To adopt any other “tack” toward our mortality is

34

We are grateful to Zuckert and Zuckert “In Its Wake,” 75–76 for bringing this
particular dimension of the Yankee’s problems to our attention. See also Catherine
Zuckert’s Natural Right and the American Imagination: Political Philosophy in Novel
Form. (Savage, MD: Rowman and Littleﬁeld Publishers Inc., 1990), 152 and
especially 34).
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to begin the search for solutions again, bringing us right back to the problems
just noted.
Such internal “attitudinal” insights need not only possess theoretical
import. After all, they cultivate greater external prudence and moderation
in his democratic readers since they, as Deneen and Romance write of the
best of American literature, “point citizens to the best angels of their
nature, even as they warn against the aspiration to make a heaven of
earth.”35 In cultivating this disposition, Mark Twain does not simply
prepare his democratic audience philosophically for the forthcoming
Personal Recollections of Joan of Arc. He prepares them politically to temper
the ideological zeal that can be unleashed by blind faith in one’s divine
cause and an equally blind faith in the scope and possibilities of progress.

35

Deneen and Romance, Democracy and Literature, 6.

